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PART II
RADAR GOES TO COURT
HERBERT R. BAER*
"RADAR AHEAD!" Automatically the motorist releases the
pressure on his accelerator. Rightly or wrongly he has been advised
that somewhere ahead there lurks a scientific ogre manned by officers of
the law and prepared to condemn him to penal action should its super-
human eye detect a violation of the speed limit. However ignorant he
may be of the scientific processes which activate the monster reported
to await him, the average motorist pays respect to its reputed powers
to determine the speed of a moving object more accurately than the
human eye unaided by electrical or mechanical contrivances. Never-
theless, opposition to the use of evidence of speed gained through radar
equipment has been made both in and out of court.1
With the development of each scientific advance the courts have
been confronted with the problem of whether or not the story told by the
scientific apparatus or process in question is to be presented to those who
* Professor of Law, The University of North Carolina School of Law.
1 Radar evidence of speed was objected to for various reasons and with varying
results in the following cases which are listed in the order in which they were
decided: State v. Moffitt, 100 A. 2d 778 (Del. Super. Ct. 1953) ; People v. Offer-
man, 204 Misc. 769, 125 N. Y. S. 2d 179 (Sup. Ct. 1953); People of City of
Rochester v. Torpey, 204 Misc. 1023, 128 N. Y. S. 2d 864 (Monroe County Ct.
1953); People v. Katz, 205 Misc. 522, 129 N. Y. S. 2d 8 (Ct. Spec. Sess. Yonkers
1954); People v. Sarver, 205 Misc. 523, 129 N. Y. S. 2d 9 (Ct. Spec. Sess. New
Rochelle 1954) ; People of City of Buffalo v. Beck, 205 Misc. 757, 130 N. Y. S. 2d
354 (Sup. Ct. 1954) and State v. Dantonio, 31 N. J. Super. 105, 105 A. 2d 918
(1954). The details and rationale of these cases will be discussed later in this
article.
While much has appeared in the newspapers both for and against the use of
radar speed detectors and legislative halls have resounded to vocal support and
attacks on the use of radar, the basis of objection seems to have been not only
the possibility of inaccuracy of the instrument or inept use by its operator but the
"unfairness" of the speed violator being caught by an apparatus hidden from his
view. Thus H. B. No. 183, introduced in the 1955 General Assembly of North
Carolina, among other things provides that officers operating speed checking de-
vices on the highways do so in "full view" of motorists.
It is not the purpose of the author to discuss the merits or demerits of the
hidden aspect of radar. See reference to this characteristic in State, . Moffitt,
.spra. Suffice it to say that it seems to this writer that if it appeared that someone
was stealing chickens nightly from a hencoop the best way to catch the culprit or
culprits would not be to light up the hencoop and put an officer outside in full
view, but would be to have an officer in hiding to catch the thief when he thought
the coast was clear for his illegal operation. To place the officer in full view would
most likely drive the culprit to some other hencoop not so well protected.
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must ultimately determine the fact. The problem before the courts is
threefold. (1) Should the data as revealed by the scientific instrument
or process be received in evidence; (2) as a prerequisite to its receipt
must expert testimony be introduced as to the theory, operation and ac-
curacy of the device or process in question; and (3) what weight or
value is to be accorded such data if received?
No one today would think of ruling out evidence offered by even a
lay witness that he weighed a certain article and it weighed ten pounds.
Being assured that the witness carefully read the scale the most that
would be required would be evidence that the scale was in accurate
working order and properly used for the purpose in question. Similarly,
a witness is without serious objection, or any objection whatsoever, per-
mitted to testify that at the time of a specific event he observed the
speedometer of the car in which he was riding and that it recorded a
speed of fifty miles per hour. In the average case opposing counsel
would not call for evidence that the speedometer was in accurate working
order. Why, then, should there be any question about the admissibility
of testimony by a police officer to the effect that the reading on a radar
speedmeter in his control and in proper working order showed the
speed of a given car subject to observation by the radar device and the
officer to be so many miles per hour?
The answer would seem to be that radar is something comparatively
new, that its method of operation is not within the understanding of the
bulk of the people, that the purported ability of radar to accurately
determine the speed of a moving object through unseen electrical im-
pulses is so far beyond the comprehension of the average person that
there is a reluctance to condemn on such evidence, and that the radar
process is such that error in the instrument or improper handling by its
operator could easily produce a false testimonial conclusion. With
variable degrees this same sort of hesitancy to admit has evidenced itself
in other instances of scientific achievement.
Thus, the use of fingerprints as a means of identification has been
recognized by our courts to have existed before Christ,2 but it was
only in 1905 that fingerprint evidence was first introduced in an English
trial.3 In 1893, long before the fingerprint method of identification was
in general use by our police departments, Mark Twain in his novel
'Stacy v. State, 49 Okla. Cr. 154, 157, 292 Pac. 885, 887 (1930) where the
court said, "From an examination of the authoritibs ... it appears that an allusion
to fingerprint impressions for the purpose of identification is referred to in writings
as early as 650 A.D., and they are traced back to a period some 100 years before
Christ. Fingerprints were first used as a manual seal to give authenticity to
documents. . . . In conformity to decisions of the courts in many states, we take
judicial knowledge that there are no two sets of fingerprints exactly alike."
'WiGmoRE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PRooF 280 (3d ed. 1937) where the author
refers to the trial of the Strattons as discussed in S. T. Felstead's "Sir Robert
Muir, a Memoir" at p. 186 (1927).
[Vol. 33
SYMPOSIUM: RADAR SPEEDMETERS
Pudd'nhead Wilson had attorney Wilson graphically describe the con-
clusive character of fingerprint identification in his address to the court
and jury.4 Wilson's fingerprint evidence acquitted his own clients and
convicted Twain's fictional personage Tom Driscoll, but the first actual
conviction in the United States based on fingerprint identification did not
occur until 19065 and the first appellate court decision in this country
passing on the admissibility of fingerprint evidence did not appear until
1911.6 Today no one questions the admissibility of such evidence as a
means of identification merely because it is now generally, if not uni-
versally, accepted that no two persons will have the same fingerprint.
7
In determining whether or not evidence of speed gained through the
use of the new scientific device of radar is to be admitted, it behooves us
to consider the philosophy which has motivated the courts in allowing in-
to evidence the results obtained through other scientific devices or
processes. The second appellate court decision in the United States
which sanctioned the use of fingerprint evidence was State v. Cerciello.8
There the New Jersey court said:
"In principle its admission as legal evidence is based upon the
theory that the evolution in practical affairs of life, whereby the
progressive and scientific tendencies of the age are manifest in
every other department of human endeavor, cannot be ignored in
legal procedure, but that the law, in its efforts to enforce justice
by demonstrating a fact in issue, will allow evidence of those sci-
entific processes which are the work of educated and skillful men
'TWAIN, PUDD'NHEAD WILSON c. XXI, p. 192, "These marks [fingerprints] are
his signature, his physiological autograph, so to speak, and this autograph cannot
be counterfeited, nor can he disguise it or hide it away, nor can it become
illegible by the wear and mutations of time . . .this signature is each man's own
-there is no duplicate of it among the swarming populations of the globe! * **
Upon this haft [of the murder dagger] stands the assassin's natal autograph,
written in the blood of that helpless atid unoffending old man who loved you and
whom you all loved. There is but one man in the whole earth whose hand can
duplicate that crimson sign.'
See Laufer, History of Finger-Print System, ANNUAL REPoRT, SMITHSONIAN
INSTITUTION 631 (1912). In this article the author shows that the art of finger-
print identification was known in great antiquity by the Chinese and brought over
by them into India.
'People v. Jennings, 252 Ill. 354, 96 N. E. 1077 (1911). In allowing the
fingerprint evidence the court recognized the case as one of first impression in the
appellate courts of the United States, but noted that such evidence had been ap-
proved by the appellate courts of Great Britain, India and certain European coun-
tries.
'See State v. Tew, 234 N. C. 612, 68 S. E. 2d 291 (1951). For a most in-
teresting article on the history and development of the art of fingerprinting see
Polson, Fingerprints and Fingerprinting, 41 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 495, 690
(1950-51). For an earlier article describing the science of fingerprinting and the
gradual acceptance of fingerprint identification evidence by appellate courts see
Inbau, Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases, Finger-Prints and Palm-Prints, 25
J. CRI.r. L. & CRrMINOLoGY 500 (1934-35).
886 N. J. L. 309, 90 Atl. 1112 (1914).
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in their various departments, and apply them to the demonstration
of a fact, leaving the weight and effect to be given to the effort
and its results entirely to the consideration of the jury."'sa
That the law shall keep pace with science is in short the philosophy
expressed by the New Jersey court. No one would deny that principle.
But if the alleged scientific device or process is still in the experimental
and unproved stage, the law with its inherent conservatism will reject
the evidence. What is experimental and unproved today becomes
demonstrable and a fact tomorrow. What was asserted by a minority
yesterday is proclaimed by the majority today.
If the development of the scientific instrument or process has not yet
reached the stage that it is either generally or universally accepted as
reliable in the particular field to which it belongs, it is necessary that
expert testimony be introduced which will assert its reliability before
the ultimate results shown by the instrument or process will be admitted
in evidence. At this stage of the development of the scientific device or
process it is readily conceivable that contrary expert evidence will be
offered which will assert the unreliability of the scientific instrument
or process in question. The mere fact that there is this contradiction
in the expert opinion on the subject does not in itself mean that the
evidence shall not go to the jury. As in every other instance of dis-
pute on the facts the jury will be asked to pass upon the validity of the
expert testimony. Thus in McKay v. State,9 which involved a prosecu-
tion for driving while intoxicated, an expert called by the state testified
that in his opinion the Harger breath test for determining intoxication
was accurate and reliable. He admitted that there were others who
disagreed with the accuracy of the test. In sustaining the admission
of the expert's testimony the court said:
"Dr. Beerstecher testified that the instrument in question is ac-
curate and he gave his reasons for it. He admitted that there
are others who disagree with its accuracy. The objection to his
testimony, therefore, goes to its weight and not to its admissi-
bility.''91
On motion for rehearing the court further said:
"It is shown that some of the states use this Harger test while
others do not; that some scientists refuse its recognition while
others accept it as reliable. * * * [W]e think that the reluctance
of the jurisprudence of some of the states to accept such a con-
81 1d. at 314, 90 Atl. at 1114.
'155 Tex. Cr. R. 416, 235 S. W. 2d 173 (1950).
,a Id. at 421, 235 S. W. at 175.
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clusion based on that test goes to the weight thereof rather than
its admissibility.
' 'ob
If the scientific device or process is in fact reliable, it eventually
passes through the period of doubt and conflicting expert opinion and
reaches the point of general, if not universal acceptance by those learned
in the field. It may go still further and be accepted as reliable not only
by those learned in the field but by the public in general. The most
frequently asserted principle is that before the court should admit into
evidence the results shown by the scientific device or process in ques-
tion, it must appear that the said device or process has gained "general
acceptance" in its particular field. Thus in Frye v. United States0 the
court said:
"Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to
define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of
the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long
way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the de-
duction is nwde must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.""
(Italics supplied.)
If in this day of rapidly advancing scientific progress the courts
are to keep pace with science, they must take judicial notice of that
which is generally accepted as true by those learned in the scientific
fields in question. They cannot wait until every single individual
acquiesces in the scientific truths acknowledged by those skilled in the
particular science. How can the judge know what the status of ac-
ceptance of a scientific device or process is among those learned in the
field? Of course he can take expert testimony in each case and inquire
from the experts as to the acceptance of the device or process. 12 He
might resort to the encyclopedia and scientific treatises on the subject.' 3
:b 155 Tex. Cr. R. 416, 422, 235 S. W. 2d 173, 176 (1950).
10293 Fed. 1013 (D. C. Cir. 1923).
"1 Id. at 1014.
2 When the expert is produced, he may explain the device or process and certify
to its general acceptance for reliability by those skilled in the science, or he may,
without explaining the operation of the device or theory of the technique, certify
that it is generally recognized as accurate and reliable by those learned in the
field.
1" It is a well established principle of the doctrine of judicial notice that the
matter in question need not be such common knowledge that it is known by the
public in general. Nor need it be within the actual knowledge of the judge. The
court may inform itself of the facts, theories and conclusions which have come
to be established and accepted by the specialists in the areas of the scientific
knowledge in question. To inform itself the court may refer to encyclopedias and
scientific treatises or pamphlets and other sources which can be deemed authorita-
19551
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He might attend some institute or be advised by a specially created min-
istry of justice as to the present status of various scientific discoveries.1 4
He might simply be told by the legislature that it in its own wisdom
requires he admit the evidence. 15 But surely he cannot bury his head
in the sand and wait until the force of an aroused public opinion com-
pels him to see and acknowledge that which by then has become the
common knowledge of the street.
Today the use of photographs and x-rays is every day court practice.
It was not always so. Thus, in People z. Jennings,16 our first reported
case sustaining fingerprint evidence, the court said:
"When photography was first introduced it was seriously ques-
tioned whether pictures thus created could properly be introduced
in evidence, but this method of proof, as well as by means of x-rays
and the microscope, is now admitted without question." 164
A reference to photography requires that we consider the anomalous
position of such evidence in the North Carolina courts. In most states
the photograph or x-ray is admitted as substantive evidence--that is,
tive. See Dwinnell-Wright Co. v. National Fruit Produ.ct Co., 140 F. 2d 618
(1st Cir. 1944) and 9 WIGMORE, EvIDENcE § 256 (3d ed. 1940).
For the convenience of those wishing to inform themselves by reading a sci-
entific article on Radar Speedmeters there is published in this Law Review at
343 supra, an article by Dr. John M. Kopper, a learned authority in the field. Dr.
Kopper received his doctorate degree in Electrical Engineering from Johns Hop-
kins and is currently on the staff of that University. For twelve years he taught
electrical engineering both at the undergraduate and graduate levels including
courses on automatic control. He has for years been and currently is engaged in
electrical research and has on several occasions appeared in court as an expert wit-
ness on the science and nature of radar speedmeters. See, for example, People v.
Katz, 205 Misc. 522, 129 N. Y. S. 2d 8 ,(Ct. Spec. Sess. Yonkers 1954), People
v. Sarver, 205 Misc. 523, 129 N. Y. S. 2d 9 (Ct. Spec. Sess. New Rochelle 1954)
and State v. Dantonio, 31 N. J. Super, 105, 105 A. 2d 918 (1954), in which cases
Dr. Kopper's testimony was accepted by the court as establishing the accuracy
and reliability of the radar speedmeter. In the Sarver case the court said, "On the
evidence before the court, it conclusively appears that the radar or electronic speed-
meter is an accurate and reliable instrument for the measurement of velocity," 205
Misc. 523, -, 129 N. Y. S. 2d 9, 13.
" See Pound, A Ministry of Justice as a Means of Making Progress i Medi-
cine Available to Courf and Legislatures, 10 U. oF CHi. L. REv. 323 (1942-43).
Dean Pound suggested such an agency as a means of keeping the judicial pro-
fession abreast of medical science. Such institutions are available in European
countries and are a means of keeping the judiciary informed in various scientific
fields. See McDermott, The Proof of Paternity and the Progress of Science, 1
HowARD L. Rav. 40 (1955).
1 "See, for example, N. C. GE~r. STAT. § 8-50.1 (1953) commented on in 27
N. C. L. Rav. 456 (1949) where the North Carolina legislature in 1949 provided
that in cases involving paternity the court shall under certain conditions admit
evidence of the result of blood grouping tests. The statute makes no provision
as to the weight to be given such evidence. Whether a negative finding of pa-
ternity on the basis of blood tests would require the setting aside of a verdict
of paternity has not yet been decided in North Carolina.
18252 Ill. 534, 96 N. E. 1077 (1911). And see the opinion of Chief Justice Clark
in Lupton v. Express Co., 169 N. C. 671, 86 S. E. 614 (1915).
"'People v. Jennings, 252 Ill. 534, 548, 96 N. E. 1077, 1082 (1911).
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as proof of the fact to be established. In North Carolina the peculiar doc-
trine of not according photographs the standing of substantive evidence,
but restricting their use to explaining or illustrating the testimony of
the witness, runs into difficulty when the court is confronted with x-ray
evidence. The theory of the North Carolina court in regard to photo-
graphs is that the witness refers to the photograph merely to illustrate
his testimony and to make it more clear to the jury. The witness saw
the object, the photo reveals a picture of the object, the witness states it
is an accurate representation and through its use illustrates his oral
testimony. But, the jury is admonished, the photograph is not to be
considered substantive evidence.' 7
What happens when the x-ray is used ?'s The witness has not seen
'" See Hunt v. Wooten, 238 N. C. 42, 76 S. E. 2d 326 (1953) where the North
Carolina view is restated and cases are collected. See excellent article by Gardner,
The Camera Goes to Court, 24 N. C. L. Rav. 233 (1946) in which the North
Carolina view of refusing to admit photographs as substantive evidence is criti-
cized. See also McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE 388 (1954) where the learned author in
referring to the North Carolina distinction according photographs illustrative
qualities but not substantive weight says, "It is believed that this distinction is
groundless and that the photograph as part of the descriptive testimony is just
as much substantive evidence as the testimony of a witness describing the features
of a scene or object without a photograph would be. It may be correctly de-
scribed as both 'illustrative' and 'substantive'."
8 It is worthy to note that while the courts are sometimes accused of being slow
to accept the benefit of new scientific inventions, unsual speed in acceptance was
shown in connection with the x-ray. The x-ray -process was discovered by Pro-
fessor William Konrad Roentgen of Wurtsburg, Germany in 1895. One year later
x-rays photos were admitted in evidence in this country in Smith v. Grant, tried
in the District Court of Colorado, First Division, on December 3, 1896. The
opinion of Judge Lefevre, who sat as trial judge in ruling on the admissibility of
the x-ray photos, is reported in 29 CHicAGO LEGAL NEws 145, issue of December
26, 1896. Certain portions of this first ruling on the admissibility of x-rays are
worthy of quotation. After noting that the x-ray differs from the normal photo-
graph in that no one can certify that he saw what the x-ray shows, Judge Lefevre
says:
"We * * * have been presented with a photograph taken by means of a
new scientific discovery, the same being acknowledged in the arts and in sci-
ence. It knocks for admission at the temple of learning and what shall
we do or say? Close fast the doors or open wide the portals? * * * The law
is the acme of learning throughout the ages. It is the essence of reason,
wisdom and experience. * * * We must not, however, hedge ourselves round
about with rule, precept and precedent until we can advance no further.
Our field must ever grow as trade, the arts and science seek to enter in.
* * * Let the courts throw open the door to all well -considered scientific
discoveries. Modem science has made it possible to look beneath the tissues
of the human body and has aided surgery in telling of the hidden mysteries.
We believe it to be our duty in this case to be the first, if you please to so
consider it, in admitting in evidence a process known and acknowledged as
a determinate science. The [x-ray] exhibits will be admitted as evidence."
While the x-ray picture itself must, 'of course, be authenticated, Spivey v.
Newman, 232 N. C. 281, 59 S. E. 2d 844 (1950), it is no longer necessary for a
witness to testify to the reliability and trustworthiness of the x-ray process as
such. Thus in Call v. City of Burley, 57 Idaho 58, 73, 62 P. 2d 101, 107 (1936)
the court said:
"The science of X-ray skiagraphy is too well founded and generally recog-
nized to render it any longer necessary for a witness to testify to the re-
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through the skin and flesh of the individual to the bone beneath. It is
not the eye of the witness that. has penetrated to those depths but the
eye of the x-ray. That instrument has revealed on the x-ray plate the
break in the bone not discernible to the human eye. The doctor takes
the stand, he testifies to the broken bone, not as he saw it, but as seen
by the x-ray.19 The physician is unable say, "I saw the broken bone as
this x-ray illustrates," which is what the witness does when using the
ordinary photograph. Instead he says, "I did not and could not see the
bone to tell whether or not it was broken. But this x-ray photograph
shows the bone is broken." Clearly the x-ray is being used as sub-
stantive evidence, and instead of the x-ray photo explaining and making
clear the testimony of the witness to the jury as in the ordinary photo-
graph case, the physician is explaining and making clear to the jury
the significance of the x-ray itself. The position of the substantive and
the explanatory is reversed.
In Spivey v. Newman;° the North Carolina court said:
"Expert evidence as to what a duly authenticated x-ray picture
shows is undoubtedly admissible where it tends to aid the jury
to understand the nature and extent of injuries involved in the
action on trial."
Perhaps a realization by the court that necessity has compelled it to
permit the use of x-rays as substantive evidence to be explained by the
witness, may some day lead to the abandonment of the "for illustrative
purposes only rule" applied to other photographs.
21
The importance of a consideration of the evidential value of x-rays
in relation to radar is readily apparent. The x-ray through the use of
electrical waves or impulses has revealed the broken bone, the im-
bedded bullet, etc., which the physician could not see. The radar through
the use of radio waves has revealed the speed of an object which the
unaided human eye and brain could not determine with any degree of
liability and trustworthiness of X-ray skiagrams as such before admitting
them in evidence."
See to similar effect Lupton v. Southern Express Co., 169 N. C. 671, 86 S. E. 614
(1915) and 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 795 (3d ed. 1940). See also Scott, X-ray
Pictures as Evidence, 44 MICH. L. REV. 772 (1946).
"D With his usual aptness for Biblical quotation, Justice Clarkson in Eaker v.
International Shoe Co., 199 N. C. 379, 386, 154 S. E. 667, 671 (1930) illustrated
the characteristic of the x-ray by saying, "The x-ray pictures are not like the man
that looks in a glass. . . . 'For he beholdeth himself, and goeth his way, and
straightway forgetteth what manner of man he was.' James 1:23, 24."20232 N. C. 281, 285, 59 S. E. 2d 844, 847 (1950).
2" There was a time, indeed, when the court itself gave an indication that it was
prepared to abandon the distinction. Thus in Simpson v. American Oil Co., 219
N. C. 595, 600, 14 S. E. 2d 638, 640 (1941) the court said, "The thin line be-
tween the substantive and auxiliary function of photographs in this connection
which this Court seems still, on occasion, to regard, was not violated." And see
STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE 53 (1946).
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accuracy. The lines and shadows on the x-ray plate disclose the broken
bone or bullet; the calibrated needle or the permanent graph of the radar
speedmeter reveals the speed of the passing car.21 a
Turning to another scientific development utilizing electric waves,
we might mention the electro-encephalogram. Since its development in
the late nineteen twenties and early thirties the electro-encephalogram
has become well recognized in the field of medicine as a reliable ap-
paratus for discovering the existence of brain injury. Through the use
of electrodes applied to various portions of the subject's cranium tracings
are made. By proper interpretation of the waves made by those tracings,
brain injury can be discovered.
Epilepsy is one of the conditions which can be discovered by the
use of the electro-encephalogram. In a British murder 'trial in the
early nineteen forties, the defense was interposed that the killing was
perpetrated while the accused suffered an epileptic seizure. It was
important to establish the fact that the accused suffered from epilepsy.
During his period of incarceration and surveillance following his arrest
he suffered no such seizure. But an electro-encephalogram tracing was
made of the individual which showed the accused was suffering from
epilepsy. Upon this evidence being introduced, the jury returned a ver-
dict of "guilty but insane."
22
More recently an American court has held that the trial judge must
accept in evidence the testimony of a physician interpreting the tracing
of an electro-encephalogram. Thus in State v. Shiren23 the accused was
being prosecuted in a New Jersey court for driving while intoxicated.
By way of defense the accused claimed he was not intoxicated but ill.
In support of this position he offered the testimony of a neurologist to
the effect that he had made an electro-encephalogram of the accused,
and that the brain wave pattern as shown by that instrument revealed
the accused was suffering from a disease of the brain. The trial court
22. There are different types of radar speedmeters. On some there is a cali-
brated dial, as found on the usual automobile speedometer, and as the car passes
through the radar beam the needle on the meter advances to a point showing the
maximum speed of the car. Other types not only have the calibrated dial with
the moving needle, but also have connected therewith a graph machine which
records in permanent form a graph of the speed of the passing car. See detailed
reference to this latter type of radar equipment in State v. Dantonio, 31 N. J.
Super. 105, 105 A. 2d 918 (1954).
22 Middle Templar, From an Office Window, 20 CAN. B. REv. 794, 798 (1942)
where the author concludes by saying, "Thus the electro-encephalograph may save
a man from being hanged for a crime of which he was not even conscious. The
plea is accordingly put forward that the use of an electro-encephalograph should
be allowed at the public expense in serious cases if the doctor certifies that there
is a prima facie case for suspecting epilepsy."
2 15 N. J. Super. 440, 83 A. 2d 620 (1951). In discussing the principle to be
applied to the admission of scientific evidence, the court quoted with approval
what had been said in the fingerprint case of State v. Cerciello as found in the
body of this article at note 8 supra.
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refused to allow this evidence. In reversing, the appellate court declared
that the exclusion of the evidence of the encephalogram tracings as in-
terpreted by the neurologist was a deprivation of substantial rights of
the accused.
Not all scientific developments have received judicial recognition.
Most prominent in the field which has thus far failed to meet with the ap-
proval of the courts is the polygraph, or lie detector. Although accepted
by some trial judges results of such tests have been systematically ex-
cluded by the appellate courts in the absence of'a consent stipulation to
their use.24  Efforts to introduce into evidence results obtained by the
use of hypnosis or so-called truth serums as scopolamine and sodium
pentothal have likewise met with failure.25 Much has been written both
for and against the use of the results of polygraph lie detector tests as
evidence of veracity.26 However, it seems to be generally agreed, even
by the proponents of such evidence, that there is some area of inaccuracy
or indefiniteness in the polygram patterns in from one to 25 per cent
of the cases.
27
It is not the purpose of the writer to argue the merits or demerits of
"'Illustrative cases cited in chronological order: People v. Becker, 300 Mich.
562, 2 N. W. 2d 503 (1942) ; State v. Cale, 354 Mo. 181, 188 S. W. 2d 43 (1945) ;
People v. Wochnick, 98 Cal. App. 2d 124, 219 P. 2d 70 (1950) and Henderson v.
State, 94 OIda. Cr. 45, 230 P. 2d 495 (1951). A discordant note is found in the
concurring opinion of justice Chappel in Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368, 37 N. W.
2d 593 (1949). The majority of the court was adverse to admitting results of lie
detector tests in evidence, but Justice Chappel thought this might be done in a
proper case. Where the state and accused stipulated to the taking of a lie de-
detector test and the introduction in evidence of the results obtained, the ruling
of the trial court admitting such evidence offered on the part of the state was
sustained in People v. Houser, 85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P. 2d 937 (1948). For
an opinion of a trial court ruling in favor of admission even in the absence of
stipulation see People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N. Y. S. 2d 348 (Queens County
Ct. 1938). For an excellent discussion of the theory of the polygraph, its re-
puted accuracy, and complete listing of cases in which the appellate courts have
passed on evidence obtained by lie detector tests up to the year 1953 see, Wicker,
The Polygraphic Truth Test and the Law of Evidence, 22 TENN. L. REv. 711
(1953). See also the symposium which follows Dean Wicker's article in the
aforesaid Law Review, pp. 728 to 774. Expert testimony as to the theory and
accuracy of lie detector tests has not led to the admission of the results of such
tests. See Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013 (D. C. Cir. 1923) and State v.
Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 246 N. W. 314 (1933). Also in this connection see the an-
notation to People v. Becker, supra, in 139 A. L. R. 1174 (1942).
" See Depres, Legal Aspects of Drug-Induced Statements, 14 U. oF Cm. L.
REv. 601 (1946-47) ; People v. McNichol, 100 Cal. App. 2d 554, 224 P. 2d 21
(1950) ; State v. Lindemuth, 56 N. M. 257, 243 P. 2d 325 (1952) and Orange v.
Commonwealth, 191 Va. 423, 61 S. E. 2d 267 (1950).
11 See INBAU, LIE DETECrION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION (2d ed. 1948).
See also Wicker, supra note 24; Streeter and Belli, The "Fourth Degree": The
Lie Detector, 5 VAND. L. REv. 549 (1951-52); and Reid, The Lie Detector in
Court, 4 Da PAUL L. REv. 31 (1954).
27 See INBAU, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 77 (2d ed. 1948).
Mr. Inbau points out that although accuracy is found in 75 per cent of the cases,
actual error is probably not present in more than 5 per cent, but that the remaining
20 per cent are of such indefinite character that no diagnosis can properly be made
on the basis of the tracings.
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lie detector tests. It is sufficient at this point to show that not all sci-
entific developments are accepted by the courts as sufficiently accurate
to warrant their results being introduced in evidence. Whether the
courts choose to reject such evidence on the theory that lie detectors
have not gained a sufficient reputation for accuracy by those skilled in
the science, or whether the courts exclude such evidence because of
possibility of creating jury prejudice, is at this moment of no concern.2
8
Suffice it to say that results of lie detector tests are in general excluded
whereas results of blood tests, 28s urine analyses,2 fingerprints,30 bal-
listic tests,31 x-rays, 2 and electro-encephalograms 3s are generally ad-
mitted.
In the light of this situation we may properly ask in what category
we are to place the results gained through the use of radar. To the
author the answer seems clear. Radar falls in with the x-ray and related
scientific developments. It deals with the physical fact of the defendant's
speed and not with his mental processes. Its task is not to read the
mind of the defendant, nor to explore whether or not he is withholding
what he knows to be true and declaring that which he knows to be
false. It is not concerned with his state of mind but only with the
physical speed of the object he is driving.
It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss all the scientific
devices and processes on whose evidentiary value the courts have been
called upon to rule. The literature is abundant in the over-all field.34
"See the capable analytical discussion in McCoRmiCK, EVIDENCE § 174, par-
ticularly at page 373 (1954).
"' Ladd and Gibson, Legal-Medical Aspects of Blood Tests to Determine In-
toxication, 29 VA. L. Rlv. 749 (1942-43); Ladd and Gibson, The Medico-Legal
Aspects of the Blood Test to Determine Intoxication , 24 IowA L. REv. 191
(1939); and Rowell, Admissibility of Esidence Obained by Scientific Devices and
Analyses, 5 V. OF FLA. L. REv. 5 (1952). Several states have enacted statutes
which establish standards of proof. Thus the New York statute provides, among
other things, that fifteen hundredths of one per centum or more by weight of
alcohol in blood is prima facie evidence that the defendant was in an intoxicated
condition, N. Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW c. 71, § 70 (5). A bill incorporating
these provisions of the New York statute was introduced in the Senate of the
North Carolina Legislature on February 25, 1955. For a very descriptive, diagram-
matic illustration of the effect of various percentages of alcohol in the blood, see
the illustrations in Lawrence v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. App. 2d 5, 127 P. 2d
631 (1942). Case authority sanctioning the admission of evidence of blood tests
to establish intoxication is abundant. It will suffice to cite the recent decision of
State v. Willard, 241 N. C. 259, 84 S. E. 2d 899 (1954) to that effect.
" State v. Slater, 242 Iowa 958, 48 N. W. 2d 877 (1951) ; State v. Cash, 219
N. C. 818. 15 S. E. 2d 277 (1941) ; and Toms v. State, 239 P. 2d 812 (Okla. Cr.
1952).
" See note 7 supra.
" WIGtORE, THE ScIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF § 157 (3d ed. 1937) and Inbau,
Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases, Firearms Identification-Ballistics, 24 J.
Ceiur. L. & CRImiNOLOGY 825 (1933-34).
32 See note 18 sup ra.
"See notes 22 and 23 supra.
•See, for example, WIG oRE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF (3d ed. 1937);
Rowell, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained by Scientific Dezices and Analyses,
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But rather it is thought that a discussion of a few of the leading sci-
entific discoveries will illustrate the principles heretofore applied and
illuminate the path the courts should take and the pitfalls they should
avoid in passing on the admissibility of radar evidence. We shall, ac-
cordingly, discuss but one more scientific process, namely the blood
grouping tests as a means to establish non-paternity. We select this
process both because it illustrates what one writer has called the "cultural
lag"3 5 of certain of our American courts, and because it raises most
acutely the third aspect of the problem, namely, what weight is to be
given to the fact established by the scientific device or process once it
has been admitted in evidence.
Modern blood grouping had its origin with the discovery of human
blood groups by Landsteiner in 1900.36 Further discoveries in this area
were made from time to time. The gist of these is that by blood grouping
tests made of the mother, child and alleged father it may be affirmatively
shown that the accused male is not the father. The test results will not
exclude parentage in all cases. They will never prove parentage. But
in many instances the groupings will incontrovertibly establish the im-
possibility of paternity of the child in question by the accused.
3 7
As early as 1924 German courts88 admitted results of blood group-
ing tests as relevant evidence in paternity cases and, after the discovery
by Landsteiner and Levine in 192739 of the previously unrecognized M
and N factors in human blood, results of such tests were admitted in
the high courts of England and the leading continental countries.40 The
courts of the United States were not as quick to grasp the significance
of blood grouping tests.
5 U. OF FLA. L. REv. 5 (1952), also reprinted in 6 ARK. L. REy. 181 (1952) ; and
Smith, Scientific Proof and Relations of Law and Medicine, 10 U. OF CHI. L.
REv. 243 (1943).
" Britt, Blood-grouping Tests and the Law: The Problem of "Cultural Lag,"
21 MINN. L. RZv. 671 (1937).
36 Ibid.
37 See explanation of the process in detail as found in Hooker and Boyd, Blood
Grouping as a Test of Non-Paternity, 25 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 187 (1934-
35) and as also found in Britt, subra note 35.
"McDermott, The Proof of Paternity and the Progress of Science, 1 HOWARD
L. REv. 40 (1955).
"o Hooker and Boyd, supra note 37.
"0 The appellate courts in Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland and Italy
had accepted the results of blood grouping tests in evidence before any appellate
court in this country did so. See Hooker and Boyd, supra note 37. In the first
reported case in New York, Beuschel v. Manowitz, 151 Misc. 899, -, 271 N. Y.
Supp. 277, 281 (1934), the court quoted from an opinion of the Supreme Italian
Court of Cassation, in which that court said:
"As regards the reliability of the results obtained by this method the latest
studies and investigations show that though the determination of the blood
groups affords no positive evidence for a declaration of filiation in a given
case, it does, on the other hand, furnish incontrovertible evidence for the
exclusion of this relationship when the child's blood group does not agree,
according to a definite scheme, with that of the supposed father."
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The first decision of a court of last resort in the United States on
the admissibility of such tests in paternity cases was State v. Damm4l
rendered by the Supreme Court of South Dakota in 1933. The accused
requested that blood grouping tests be made of himself, the mother (who
incidentally was his adopted daughter), and her child. A medical ex-
pert was called who testified to the ability of the tests to establish non-
paternity in certain cases. The trial court had refused to order the blood
-grouping tests. In sustaining the conviction below the Supreme Court
said:
"It appears that evidence as to blood tests in paternity cases
has been accepted in Continental countries. We can find no
record of the question being passed upon -by any courts of last
resort in the United States. * * * [W] e think it insufficiently ap-
pears that the validity of the proposed test meets with such gen-
erally accepted recognition as a scientific fact among medical
men as to say that it constituted an abuse of discretion for a court
of justice to refuse to take cognizance thereof, as would un-
doubtedly be the case if a court today should refuse to take cog-
nizance of the accepted scientific fact that the fingerprints of no
two individuals are in all respects identical." (Italics supplied)
42
Thus the first decision of a court of last resort in the United States
rejected what had for several years been accepted by the leading tri-
bunals of Europe. The subsequent history of State v. Damn is note-
worthy. A rehearing 3 was had in 1936 and then the same South
Dakota Supreme Court appears to have caught up with scientific knowl-
edge, for it said:
"We therefore say, without further elaboration or discussion, that
it is our considered opinion that the reliability of the blood test is
definitely, and indeed unanimously, established as a matter of ex-
pert scientific opinion entertained by authorities in the field, and
we think the time has undoubtedly arrived when the results of
such tests, made by competent persons and properly offered in
evidence should be deemed admissible in a court of justice when-
ever paternity is in issue." (Italics supplied) 44
What German courts had accepted in 1924, what the South Dakota
Supreme Court had rejected as inadequately established in 1933, be-
comes incontrovertible in 1936 145 Shall we presume the conviction was
'1 62 S. D. 123, 252 N. W. 7 (1933).
2 
2 Id. at 132, 133, 252 N. W. at 11, 12.
,s State v. Damm, 64 S. D. 309, 266 N. W. 667 (1936).
"Id. at 312, 266 N. W. at 668.
'n If this article will aid some court in avoiding the embarrassing position in
which the South Dakota court found itself in 1936, it will have served its major
purpose.
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reversed? No, let us not be too hasty, for the South Dakota court con-
tinues and says:
"Notwithstanding these views, however, we continue to believe
that we were right in our former ruling * * * We are far from
willing to say that it was error for a trial judge in South Dakota
at the time of the trial of this case [1931] to fail or refuse to take
judicial notice of the reliability of blood grouping tests.
' '454
In the years following the aforesaid decision on rehearing of the
South Dakota court, innumerable state courts took judicial notice of
the scientific value of blood grouping tests to establish non-paternity,
and evidence of such tests was admitted in case after case. Here and
there, however, the light of scientific learning had not penetrated certain
judicial minds, and thus we find that as late as 1949 the Supreme Court
of Iowa in a bastardy proceeding referred to blood grouping tests in
the following language:
"In this case the record is devoid of any evidence whatever
showing general scientific recognition of the value of these tests.
[The court, however, cited and presumably read the opinion on
rehearing of the South Dakota court in State v. Danm.] Nor
was it shown that at the present time the tests are of sufficient
general acceptance for general scientific recognition as to be a
matter of which the court would take judicial notice." 46
Partly to overcome such lapses of learning on the part of the
judiciary, and partly to avoid them, the legislatures in many states have
enacted statutes providing for blood grouping tests in paternity cases
and for the admission of the results of those tests in evidence.4 7
While the passage of these statutes has paved the way for the ad-
State v. Damm, 64 S. D. 309, 318, 266 N. W. 667, 671 (1936).
' Dale v. Buckingham, 241 Iowa 40, 43, 40 N. W. 2d 45, 47 (1949).
7 See, e.g., N. C. GEN. STAT. § 8-50.1 (1953) which provides:
"In the trial of any criminal action or proceedings in any court in which the
question of paternity arises, the court before whom the matter may be
brought, upon motion of the defendant, shall direct and order that the de-
fendant, the mother and the child shall submit to a blood grouping test;
provided, that the court, in its discretion, may require the person requesting
the blood grouping test to pay the cost thereof. The results of such blood
grouping tests shall be admitted in evidence when offered by a duly licensed
practicing physician or other qualified person.
In the trial of any civil action, the court before whom the matter may be
brought, upon motion of either party, shall -direct and order that the de-
fendant, the -plaintiff, the mother and the child shall submit to a blood group-
ing test; provided, that the court, in its discretion may require the person re-
questing the blood grouping test to pay the cost thereof. The results of
such blood grouping tests shall be admitted in evidence when offered by a
duly licensed practicing physician or other duly qualified person."
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mission of the results of blood grouping tests they have not disposed of
the third aspect of the problem, i.e., what weight is to be given to test
results which establish non-paternity? If the blood grouping tests
establish that the accused could not have fathered the child in question,
shall we permit a jury verdict to the contrary to stand and convict the
defendant when the incontrovertible scientific data shows he could
not have been guilty? It is here that our American courts are still at
odds with one another.
Thus in 1946 in the much publicized bastardy case of Berry v.
Chaplin4 8 the California court permitted a verdict of the jury finding
paternity on the part of the defendant Charles Chaplin to stand despite
the fact that blood grouping tests indisputably showed the defendant
could not have been the father. Similarly an Ohio court49 held that
blood grouping tests which showed the alleged father could not have
been the parent were not entitled to conclusive weight, but were only
to be considered with other evidence in the case.
More recently, however, the absolute injustice of convicting a man of
bastardy in the face of evidence of properly conducted blood grouping
tests establishing non-paternity has induced certain of our courts to set
aside verdicts of guilty. Thus in 1949, the Supreme judicial Court of
Maine50 declared that a jury verdict of paternity could not be permitted
to stand when the evidence of blood grouping tests which had been prop-
erly and accurately made established that the defendant was not the
father. To similar import is a decision of a New York court51 in 1950
where Justice Shientag remarked in his concurring opinion:
"The legislature has not thus far seen fit to make conclusive the
blood grouping test where definite exclusion of paternity is
established. Despite that, however, the courts may not ignore
'8 74 Cal. App. 2d 652, -, 169 P. 2d 442, 451 (1946). Note the following
language of the cou rt: "The report and the evidence of the physicians were not
controverted by any scientific evidence but were before the jury to be considered
with all of the other evidence in the case .... But the blood tests were not con-
clusive evidence .... When scientific testimony and evidence as to facts conflict
the jury or the trial court must determine the relative weight of the evidence."
In a later case, Hill v. Johnson, 102 Cal. App. 2d 94, 226 P. 2d 655 (1951), the
California court held it was error to admit the results of blood grouping tests
showing the husband was not the father since it was contrary to a conclusive pre-
sumption of legitimacy where it was shown the husband had access to his wife dur-
ing the period of conception, citing CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1962 (5) which pro-
vides for the conclusive presumption.
" State v. Holod, 63 Ohio App. 16, 24 N. E. 2d 962 (1939). The results of
the blood grouping tests were admitted under a state statute which, like that of
North Carolina, made no provision for their conclusiveness."0 Jordan v. Mace, 144 Me. 351, 69 A. 2d 670 (1949).
" Commissioner of Welfare v. Costonie, 277 App. Div. 90, 97 N. Y. S. 2d 804
(1st Dep't 1950). See also United States v. Shaughnessy, 123 F. Supp. 674,
676 (S. D. N. Y. 1954) where by way of dictum the court said, "Blood tests.
properly taken, can absolutely exclude the possibility of paternity in certain cases."
For further discussion of this aspect see McDermott, supra note 38.
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the universal scientific opinion that such tests, resulting in ex-
clusion, are, in fact, conclusive on the issue of paternity. * * *
Such scientific exclusion should, assuming the test to have been
competently and accurately made, be accepted as conclusive by
the trial court, notwithstanding the strength, as in this case,
of the nonscientific testimony to the contrary. '5 2  (Italics sup-
plied)
And thus we see our courts have travelled the complete gamut. From
the holding by the South Dakota court53 in 1933 to the effect that results
of blood grouping tests were not entitled to be given consideration by
the jury to establish lack of paternity, we arrive at the holding of the
Maine54 and New York 55 courts in 1949 and 1950 that not only are
the blood grouping tests to be considered but they are conclusive when
they establish lack of paternity notwithstanding a jury verdict to the
contrary.
In the light of the foregoing discussion showing the responses of the
courts as to the evidentiary valud of various scientific devices and
processes, we shall now examine in detail the few reported cases in
which the courts have ruled upon the admission of evidence of speed
determined by a radar speedmeter. Some of these are decisions of trial
judges and others are opinions of appellate courts. We shall consider
them in chronological order.
The first of the reported cases is State v. Moffitt. 0  The report con-
sists of the charge given by a Delaware trial judge in September 1953.
The state had offered evidence of two highway troopers to the effect
that they had clocked the speed of the defendant by means of a radar
speedmeter which showed defendant was driving 63 miles per hour in
a 50 mile per hour zone. The state also had produced an expert wit-
ness who had testified in detail as to the construction and operation of
the speedmeter and who had also advised of means for testing the ac-
curacy of such meter.
The defendant made two objections relative to the radar evidence of
speed. First, he said that the radar speedmeter had never been re~og-
nized as being a reliable instrument to record speed of vehicles on the
highway, and second, that even if evidence of speed obtained through
the use of the meter were admitted it should not be held, standing alone,
to be conclusive evidence of the defendant's speed.
The trial judge overruled defendant's objections, admitted the evi-
l2277 App. Div. 90, -, 97 N. Y. S. 2d 804, 806 (lst Dep't 1950).
. 3Supra note 41.
' Supra note 50.
" Supra note 51.
rs 100 A. 2d 778 (Del. Super. Ct. 1953).
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dence of speed as shown by the radar speedmeter, and in charging the
jury, said:
"Based upon the testimony of the expert, I concluded that the
evidence as to the accuracy of the speed meter was admissible
* * * subject, of course, to your determination as to its accuracy
in measuring the speed of the defendant's vehicle under all the cir-
cumstances of the present case."
'57
Referring to the fact that the detection of the defendant's speed had
been made by highway troopers and not by the radar speedmeter expert,
the court said:
"The mere fact that the test in the present case was made by a
person not skilled in electronics is not of sufficient import to render
the speed meter inadmissible in evidence."5 8
As to the value of the radar speedmeter as a scientific instrument
to record speed, the court said:
"I conclude, therefore, that an electronic speed meter of the
make and kind used in the present case, if found to be properly
functioning and being operated in a proper fashion, is a device
that the jury may find to be a correct recorder of speed. * * *
It falls in the category of recognized instruments used to de-
termine the speed of a moving vehicle, such as a speedometer."59
(Italics supplied)
After further instructing the jury that they must be satisfied the
radar instrument was accurate as established by tests reasonably near
to the date in question, the court, in relation to defendant's second ob-
jection, instructed the jury that the evidence of violation of the speed
limit as shown by the radar speedmeter would, standing alone, "furnish
sufficient evidence for the conviction of the defendant."'60
The second reported case, which is the first decision of an appellate
court in this country on the radar speedmeter, is the New York de-
cision of People v. Offerman,61 rendered in October 1953. The de-
fendant had been convicted in the City Court of Buffalo for violating
the speed limit. The trial had been without a jury. The trial judge
had admitted evidence given by officers making up a radar team to
the effect that the dial of the radar speedmeter showed the defendant
was travelling 41 miles per hour in a 30 mile an hour zone. The sole
Id. at 779.
' Ibid.
Ibid.00 State v. Moffitt, 100 A. 2d 778, 780 (Del. Super. Ct. 1953).
01204 Misc. 769, 125 N. Y. S. 2d 179 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
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evidence of speed was the reading on the dial. No expert witness was
called, as in the Moffltt6 2 case, to testify to the construction, theory and
accuracy of the speedmeter. Instead, one officer testified that after the
radar instrument had been set up, a test car was run through the beam
and the speed as shown on the speedmeter dial in his control was the
same as reported to him by the officer of the test car as shown by the
speedometer of that car. The officer in the test car also testified that as
his car went through the beam he noted the speed on his speedometer
and it agreed with the reading on the radar speedmeter as reported to
him by the officer in control of the meter.
While no expert in electronics was produced, the state did offer the
testimony of a third police officer. The state attempted to qualify him
as an expert on radar speedmeters but the trial judge ruled he was not
an expert since he was not an electronics engineer, had had no formal
training in radio or engineering but had merely installed the radar
equipment in the police cars. Thereupon, both sides moved for an ad-
journment so that an expert could be produced, but these motions were
denied by the trial court. Instead, he permitted the aforesaid officer who
had not qualified as an expert to testify as to the construction, operation
and accuracy of the radar device. The only other material in the case re-
lating to accuracy of the speedmeter was a statement by the trial judge
that he had himself made a test of the device by running his own car
through the beam of such a meter and found that it was accurate "on the
nose."
63
Four aspects of the case are considered on appeal. First, the court
found that the trial judge committed error in permitting the two officers
making up the radar team to testify that the speed as shown on their
speedmeter, or speedometer respectively, was the same as the speed
shown on their co-officer's meter as reported to them at the time of the
test. Clearly the court was correct in stating that the officer in the test
car could not testify to the speed shown on the radar speedmeter as
reported to him by the other officer. And the converse is likewise true.
However, this element of hearsay, while declared error, was not said
by the court to be sufficient in itself to warrant a reversal. Indeed,
proper trial procedure would simply require that each officer testify as
to the speed shown on his respective meter when the test was made and
it is a simple process for the jury to determine from the identical nature
of this testimony that the two instruments were recording the same
speed.
Secondly, the appellate court found that the trial court abused its
discretion when it failed to grant an adjournment so that the evidence
"2Supra note 56.
63 People v. Offerman, 204 Misc. 769, -, 125 N. Y. S. 2d 179, 184 (Sup. Ct.
1953).
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of an expert could be obtained as to the nature, operation and accuracy
of a radar speedmeter. Thirdly, the court held it was error for the
trial judge to permit the third officer who had not qualified as an expert
to testify as to the accuracy of the radar speedmeter. Fourthly, the
court found the statement made by the trial judge as to his own test of
the accuracy of the radar speedmeter device to be objectionable, both be-
cause it necessarily had to be founded on hearsay information as to what
had appeared on the speedmeter when he drove his own car through the
beam, and further because the judge had taken into consideration his
private knowledge on a subject which "does not lie within the field of
judicial notice under the circumstances of this case as the operation of
this device is not a practical application of scientific facts which are
generally known or ought to be known." 64
Clearly, again, the court was correct in that the trial judge could
not know of the accuracy of the radar speedmeter by making a personal
test in driving his car through the beam without accepting the hearsay
statement of the person in charge of the meter. However, the critical
portion of the court's opinion is that which declares the radar device
does not lie within the field of judicial notice on the ground that the
operation of such device is not a practical application of scientific facts
which are generally known or ought to be known. The court concluded
its opinion by referring to the New York Traffic Law, 5 wherein the
legislature had provided that a certain percentage of alcohol in the blood
is prima facie proof of intoxication, and suggested that perhaps some
day in the future the legislature may provide that the reading of speed
as shown on a radar speedmeter shall be considered prima facie the
speed of the vehicle in question:
"By such legislation the people will be relieved of the burden of
proving the accuracy of the electrical time device upon each trial
and by expert testimony. The traveling public will be protected
against convictions based upon the reading of an unproven and
possibly inaccurate device and of equal importance the rules of
evidence will not be violated.
'6 6
From the above analysis of the decision of the first appellate court
passing on the radar speed meter, it is apparent that the basic objection
was the lack of expert testimony in the trial court. It is clear, also, that
the court was of the opinion that as of the then date, in the absence of
legislation on the subject, expert evidence would have to be introduced
' Ibid.
See note 28a supra."' People v. Offerman, 204 Misc. 769, -, 125 N. Y. S. 2d 179, 185 (Sup. Ct.
1953).
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as to the accuracy of the operation of the speedmeter before its results
could be considered by the court or jury.
People of the City of Rochester v. Torpey67 is the third reported case
on the radar speedmeter. It is a decision of an inferior appellate court
in New York rendered in December, 1953. The defendant had been
convicted in the City Court of Rochester of violating the speed laws.
The People introduced the testimony of police officers, who had manned
the radar unit and observed the defendant's car passing, that in their
opinion it was going 45 miles per hour, and further introduced evidence
to the effect that the radar speed device which had been trained on the
car in question showed a reading of 43 miles per hour as the defendant's
speed. Either of those speeds was well above the city speed limit.
The court pointed out that the testimony of the police officers' personal
opinions as to speed was in itself sufficient to convict the defendant, but
it then went on to discuss the admissibility of the evidence of the reading
on the radar speedmeter.
In this connection the court noted that no expert testimony had been
introduced as to the accuracy of radar for the purpose of measuring
speed. There had been evidence by the police officers that they had
tested the meter by running a test car through the beam and by com-
paring the readings on the speedometer and speedmeter. Also evidence
was introduced to show that the speedometer on the test car had been
tested and found in good working order. 7 In the light of the personal
67204 Misc. 1023, 128 N. Y. S. 2d 864 (Monroe County Ct. 1953).
" It will be noticed that the state in cases where it is using a radar speed-
meter invariably puts in evidence to the effect that the speedmeter was checked
with the speedometer of a test car that was run through the beam. Upon finding
the two speed readings were the same, it is presumed in some cases that the read-
ings on the radar speedmeter were accurate. In certain instances the state may
go further and offer evidence showing that the speedometer on the test car
had recently been tested and been found correct. Further than that the proof
has not gone. But one may ask, "What about the accuracy of the instruments,
stop watch, or otherwise, that were used in testing the accuracy of the speedom-
eter in the test car.. And going" back still further, what evidence is there of the
accuracy of the instruments or process used in checking the stop watch, that
checked the speedometer in the test car, that checked the radar speedmeter?" It
is apparent that at some point in the checking process the accuracy of the in-
strument which is the checking authority must be taken for granted, for if not
we would eventually be brought to the point of questioning the accuracy of the
steel tape or surveyor's device which measured off the test mile area. In this
connection, the English case of Nicholas v. Penny, [1950] 2 K. B. 466 (C.A.)
also reported and annotated in 21 A. L. R. 2d 1193 is of considerable interest.
While the instrument used by the police in determining the accused's speed was
not a radar speedmeter but the customary speedometer found in automobiles, the
court held that a conviction based upon evidence of speed readings on the speed-
ometer in the police car, which followed the defendant's car at an even distance,
would be sustained even though there was no evidence of the accuracy of said
speedometer, since, in the absence of contravening evidence, the readings on the
speedometer in the police car would be deemed to be prima facie correct.
The author of the annotations to this case states that there apparently are no
American cases directly holding that evidence of measurements by mechanical
instruments will be presumed correct in the absence of any evidence that the in-
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opinion testimony of the officers, plus the testimony aforesaid as to the
reading on the radar speedmeter, the county court held there was suffi-
cient evidence to sustain the conviction of the defendant.
But the court took pains to point out that if the People's sole evi-
dence of speed on the part of the defendant was the reading on the radar
speedmeter, expert testimony would be needed to establish the accuracy
of such device. Particularly the court said:
"The use of radar is comparatively new as a means of bringing
about the arrest of violators of ordinances pertaining to the speed
of automobiles and until such time as the courts recognize radar
equipment as a method of accurately measuring the speed of
automobiles, in those cases in which the People rely solely upon
the speed indicator of the radar equipment, it will be necessary to
establish by expert testimony the accuracy of radar for the purpose
of measuring speed." (Italics supplied) 68
The fourth case in chronological sequence is People v. Katz, 69 a
decision of a trial court in Yonkers, New York, rendered in March,
1954. Testimony of police officers was to the effect that one of them
in charge of the operation of the radar apparatus observed that when
defendant's car passed through the radar beam the recording dial on the
speedmeter showed the defendant was exceeding the speed limit, and
that this information was passed on to an officer further down the high-
way who served the defendant with a summons. In addition, the prose-
cution offered in evidence the testimony of an electronics expert, Dr.
John M. Kopper, who testified in detail regarding the construction of
the radar speedmeter and fully explained its operation. He also testified
that the operator of the recording equipment can tell when it is out of
calibration, and may quite easily determine when the machine is not
working properly.
At the end of the foregoing testimony the defendant moved to dismiss
the case on the ground that the evidence offered was insufficient to
establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The reported decision
is the court's ruling on that motion. In denying the same the court re-
ferred to People v. Offerman ° discussed supra, and said:
strument has been tested for accuracy within a reasonable period. He accounts
for this dearth of authority by noting that in many American cases no objection
was raised as to the accuracy of the measuring instrument and that in the
others proof of accuracy was submitted. In certain states statutes expressly provide
that where a police speedometer has been tested and certified as accurate as re-
quired by the statute, no proof of its accuracy need be submitted. See Common-
wealth v. Parish, 138 Pa. Super. 593, 10 A. 2d 896 (1940).
" People of City of Rochester v. Torpey, 204 Misc. 1023, -, 128 N. Y. S. 2d
864, 866 (Monroe County Ct. 1953).
Gg 205 Misc. 52, 129 N. Y. S. 2d 8 (Ct. Spec. Sess. Yonkers 1954).
ro Supra note 61.
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"The objectionable and incompetent evidence which warranted a
reversal in that case is, in my opinion, not present in the instant
case.
"The Electromatic Speedometer herein described is a scientifically
reliable device which if properly operated and properly functioning
falls in the category of recognized instruments used to determine
the speed of moving vehicles."
71
Three weeks later, on March 31, 1954, the Court of Special Sessions
of New Rochelle, New York, decided People v. Sarver.72 In support
of the prosecution, evidence of a permanent graph recording of the speed
of defendant's vehicle as made by the electromatic speedmeter was in-
troduced. In addition expert testimony of Dr. John M. Kopper, the
same electronics expert who had testified in the Kat13 case, and who is
the author of the scientific article on radar speedmeters appearing in this
Law Review, was introduced, which described in detail the construction
and operation of the electronic speedmeter. Evidence was also admitted
to the effect that the speedmeter was calibrated or tested on the morning
of the day of the alleged violation, that it had been acquired six months
before the day in question, that it was manufactured by the Automatic
Signal Division of Eastern Industries, Inc. at Norwalk, Connecticut,
and that it had been frequently tested and found to be accurate when
compared with the conventional speedometer. Although no special sig-
nificance seems to have been placed on the fact, the court points out
that the officer in charge of the radar apparatus held a United States
Government Radio Telephone Operator's License, First Class, had been
a Chief Radioman in the Navy, and for two years studied electrical engi-
neering at New York University.
In its motion to dismiss, the defense relied on two grounds: (1) that
the defendant had not been properly identified, and (2) that the radar
speedmeter was inaccurate and unreliable. As to the first contention
the court said:
"Defendant contends that Officer Rabbitt, who directed the ar-
rest [and who was in charge of the radar speedmeter] could not
identify the defendant. The testimony showed that Officer Rab-
bitt saw a green truck which approached and passed him at an
excessive rate of speed as recorded on the speedmeter's graph.
This information was passed on to Officer Burkhardt, who ar-
rested the driver of the green truck, who is the defendant. The
"People v. Katz, 205 Misc. 522, -, 129 N. Y. S. 2d 8, 9 (Ct. Spec. Sess.
Yonkers 1954).72 205 Misc. 523, 129 N. Y. S. 2d 9 (Ct. Spec. Sess. New Rochelle 1954).
" Supra note 69.
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circumstances conclusively established the defendant's identity.
No further identification is necessary."7 4
In overruling the second objection of the defendant, the court referred
to People v. Offerman,75 discussed supra, and noted that the conviction
in that case had been reversed "because there was no competent evi-
dence as to the accuracy and reliability of the radar speedmeter. Such
is not the case here." 70  Then the court found that the radar speed-
meter has found its place among those scientific instruments accepted
as reliable and accurate. It states:
"On the evidence before the Court, it conclusively appears that
the radar or electromatic speedmeter is an accurate and reliable
instrumeht for the measurement of velocity. It must take its place
along with the ordinary mechanical speedometer as a device which
accurately measures the speed of a moving vehicle. * * * The
radar speedmeter is no different than any other scientific device.
Admissibility of tests made by it depends entirely on its accuracy
and reliability."77  (Italics supplied)
People of the City of Buffalo v. Beck,78 decided in April, 1954, is the
next case in sequence. At the trial, which was held without a jury
in the Buffalo City Court, the prosecution offered the testimony of four
policemen to the effect that they had personally observed the defendant's
car in motion and were of the opinion it was travelling 40 miles per hour
in a 30 mile per hour zone. In addition the prosecution introduced
evidence of the (speed of defendant's car as shown by the radar
speedmeter, No expert evidence was introduced as to the construction,
operation or accuracy of the meter. The trial judge, however, stated
that he would take judicial notice of the operation and accuracy of radar
devices to establish the speed of automobiles and found the defendant
guilty.
On appeal, the conviction was reversed by the New York Supreme
Court, Erie County, Justice Ward holding that the trial judge had com-
mitted error in taking judicial notice of the radar speedmeter as a device
for accurately measuring speed. As Justice Ward saw it the trial
judge was a bit premature.
It is doubtful if many of us understand the scientific principles which
are involved in the operation of the x-ray. The writer also doubts that
" People v. Sarver, 205 Misc. 523, -, 129 N. Y. S. 2d 9, 11 (Ct. Spec. Sess.
New Rochelle 1954).
Supra note 61.
' People v. Sarver, 205 Misc. 523, -, 129 N. Y. S. 2d 9, 12 (Ct. Spec. Sess.
New Rochelle 1954).7 Id. at -, 129 N. Y. S. 2d at 13."8205 Misc. 757, 130 N. Y. S. 2d 354 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
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Justice Ward would reverse a trial judge who took judicial notice of
the reliability of the x-ray as a means of revealing hidden bone injury.
Yet, Justice Ward seems to be of the opinion that before a judge can
take judicial notice of a radar speedmeter as an accurate device for
measuring speed, the public at large must understand the mysteries of
electronics and their particular application to the operation of a radar
speedmeter. Thus, in reversing the conviction below, he said:
"I must hold that the theory of the operation of this electrically
operated device and the accuracy of its measurement of speed is
not a proper subject for judicial notice at this time. Electronics
is a recent development in the science embracing the mysteries
of electricity. * * * Certainly it cannot be said that such knowledge
is 'notorious' as above described or that it is 'the general knowl-
edge of the country' nor is the operation of this device 'a practical
application of scientific facts which are generally known or ought
to be known.'" (Italics supplied)7 9
Although the evidence of the four officers independent of the radar
evidence showed a violation, Justice Ward ruled there had to be a re-
versal because he could not tell whether the trial judge had relied on
the officers' testimony or on the radar evidence.
The next case in sequence and the last reported one as of this writing
on the radar speedmeter is State v. Dantonio.80 It is a decision of a
New Jersey criminal court holding a trial de novo following a conviction
of the defendant in an inferior municipal court. At the trial de novo
expert testimony of the same Dr. John M. Kopper heretofore men-
tioned was introduced relative to the operation and accuracy of the
radar speedmeter. In addition evidence of state troopers was introduced
to the effect that they had duly set up the radar equipment, tested it
by running a test car through the beam, found it accurately calibrated
and proceeded to check oncoming traffic. The speeding charge was
predicated on a recording of the radar speedmeter and graph machine
connected therewith made as defendant's truck passed through the beam.
The defendant contended that (1) the trial court permitted hearsay
testimony to be given by the officers in relation to tests made of the radar
device's accuracy, and that (2) the trial court permitted testimony to be
given concerning the accuracy of the radar device by one who was not
qualified as an expert.
It will be noted that the first objection as to hearsay is the same ob-
jection the court discussed in People v. Offerman,81 supra. The
79Id. at -, 130 N. Y. S. 2d at 357.
31 N. J. Super. 105, 105 A. 2d 918 (1954).
8204 Misc. 769, 125 N. Y. S. 2d 179 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
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court properly disposed of the objection against the defendant in the
Dantonio case by saying:
"Each officer testifies as to independent facts. The patrol car
officer testifies as a fact to the speed of the patrol car as shown
by his speedometer. The radar operator testifies as to the re-
cording of the electric speedmeter and the graph machine and
of his own visual observation of the car making the test. Radio
communication [between the test car and radar operator] is
merely incidental.
'8 2
As to defendant's second contention, the court pointed out that Dr.
Kopper was an expert in electronic speed devices and fully qualified.
It also brought out the fact that on Dr. Kopper's testimony given under
cross examination, it appeared that any defects in the radar equipment,
such as defective tubes, condensers or low voltage in the battery, would
all tend to decrease the number of electrons emitted from the heat sur-
faces within the tubes and give a lower and less than true reading.
Thus, the court concluded, "All defects in the equipment resolve in
favor of the motorist."
8 3
The court referred to the first case reported, State v. Mofitt,8 4 and
said it was in full agreement with that portion of the Moffitt case which
stated that the mere fact the test was made by a person not skilled in
electronics is not of sufficient import to render radar speedmeter evi-
dence inadmissible.
Reviewing the above cases on the radar speedmeter, we find that in
all seven of them the evidence of speed as shown by the speedmeter was
admitted in the trial court. An expert in electronics familiar with the
theory and operation of the radar speedmeter testified in four of the
cases.85 In the two New York state superior appellate cases86 which
reversed the trial court, no such expert had testified. In the one New
York case 8 7 in which a conviction was sustained by an inferior appellate
court, and in which no expert had testified, the court based its affirm-
ance on the fact that there was other evidence of speed in the case,
but admonished that if the radar evidence were the sole evidence of
speed, there would be a reversal.
From a consideration of all of the opinions it is clear that the linch-
pin in the prosecution's case at the time of these decisions was expert
testimony as to the construction, theory, operation and accuracy of the,
2 31 N. J. Super. 105, -, 105 A. 2d 918, 921 (1954).
"Ibid.8,100 A. 2d 778 (Del. Super. Ct. 1953).
"These are the Moffit, Katz, Sarver and Dantonio cases.
: These are the Offerman and Beck cases.
81 This is the Torpey case.
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radar speedmeter. Without the aid of expert evidence, certain of the
courts would not recognize the said speedmeter as an instrument that
accurately registers the velocity of a moving vehicle. But it is apparent
from the decisions of those courts that had such expert evidence been
introduced, the evidence of the defendant's speed as shown by the
speedmeter would have been admitted. Thus the radar speedmeter has
already surpassed the lie detector ixn judicial recognition."8 It is equally
apparent that even those overly cautious judges who in their decisions
found that expert testimony was a prerequisite to the admission of the
speedmeter's readings did not mean to imply that such testimony would
always be essential. Thus, Justice Ward in the Beck case stated that
the radar speedmeter was not "a proper subject for judicial notice at
this time*"8 9
Some day those judges will say, "The time has now come when
we must take judicial notice of the radar speedmeter without the as-
sistance of expert testimony." And then they will solemnly declare
that the radar speedmeter falls in the category of recognized instruments
which accurately determine the speed of moving vehicles, thus adopting
as their own the language of the trial judges which they now find prema-
ture. Until that day has arrived, however, the careful law enforce-
ment officer who would be certain of sustaining a conviction based on
radar evidence of speed, would be well advised to have an electronics
expert in court to prove the construction, theory, operation and accuracy
of the radar speedmeter used in the particular case. 90
88 For, as we have seen, evidence of lie detector tests is generally excluded
even though there is expert testimony introduced as to the construction, theory,
operation and accuracy of the device. See supra note 24. Accordingly, referring
to the three aspects of the problem stated at the outset of this paper, we can
definitely state in regard to the first and second that all courts will receive evidence
of speed as shown by a radar speedmeter if expert testimony has been given as to
the construction, theory, operation and accuracy of the device, and that some
courts will admit evidence of speedmeter readings without requiring such expert
testimony. As to the third aspect of the problem, namely, what weight or value
is to be accorded the data revealed by the speedmeter, it is self evident that in
these criminal prosecutions for violating speed laws a jury verdict of not guilty,
even though in the face of evidence of radar speedmeter readings establishing guilt,
would not be set aside. This is the inherent nature of our criminal procedure. The
only way in which the court would be called upon to consider a radar speedmeter
reading as having such conclusive force that a jury verdict of guilty would be
set aside, as was done in the Maine and New York paternity cases (see supra
notes 50 and 51), would be for the state to prosecute the accused for violating the
speed limit on the basis of testimony of an observer not using a meter, and for the
accused to introduce evidence that a radar speedmeter reading made of the
speed of his car at the time in question showed he was not violating the speed
limit. From the very nature of events this situation is most unlikely to occur.
89 People of City of Buffalo v. Beck, 205 Misc. 757, -, 130 N. Y. S. 2d 354,
357 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (Italics supplied).
"0 Whenever the results obtained through the use of a new scientific device or
process are offered in evidence, the court at first may and frequently should re-
quire expert testimony. Later, as case after case has been tried and the results of
the device or process have repeatedly been introduced following the explanation of
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In both the Offerman9' and Dantoni 92 cases the court suggested
that expert testimony could be dispensed with if the legislature by
statute would provide that a reading on a radar speedmeter, which
has been certified as accurate by the authority designated by the legis-
lature, is to be admitted as prima facie evidence of the speed of the ve-
hicle driven by the accused. While such legislation would certainly re-
lieve the courts of responsibility, it appears to the writer that if the
courts properly perform their function, said legislation is no more needed
in the case of radar speedmeters than in the case of x-rays.
It is submitted that there is now more than adequate knowledge
of the operation and accuracy of radar speedmeters in the area of
science to which these devices belong to warrant their being accorded
judicial recognition without the aid of expert testimony or legislative
direction. No longer need the judge be in ignorance of the theory and
operation of these devices. Such scientific papers as that of Dr. Kopper
which appears in this Law Review should be of material aid to the
courts in determining the position that the speedmeter has in the sci-
entific field to which it belongs.
To require the production of an expert in electronics at every trial
involving the use of radar evidence is to delay justice, create unnecessary
expense and ignore the admitted progress of science. A court so doing
may well find itself in the very unenviable position of the Supreme Court
of South Dakota when,9 3 in 1936, as we have heretofore seen, it was
compelled to declare the complete reverse of its "unenlightened" de-
cision of 1933 in which it had refused to recognize judicially the efficacy
of blood grouping tests. Let us hope that at this late date in the use of
radar speedmeters no court will be so "unenlightened" as to lay the
foundation for the duplication of such an unfortunate experience!
the expert, the courts will take judicial notice of the accuracy of the scientific
device or process in question, and it is then no longer necessary to produce the
e.xpert. Until, however, a particular appellate court has said it will judicially
notice the particular scientific device or process counsel cannot safely proceed with-
out the expert.
"People v. Offernan, 204 Misc. 769, 125 N. Y. S. 2d 179 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
92 State v. Dantonio, 31 N. J. Super. 105, 105 A. 2d 918 (1954).
92 State v. Damnm, 64 S. D. 309, 266 N. W. 667 (1936) discussed supra p. 367.
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